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During the last decade Belarus was one of the leaders of growth in the CEE region. Kruk and 
Bornukova (2013) have analyzed the sources of growth and found that capital accumulation was the 
main contributor to growth. The contribution of total factor productivity (TFP) to growth was, on the 
contrary, quite modest. On the sectoral level, capital accumulation was not always accompanied by 
the increases in TFP. Hence, the new growth policy, modernization, with the bottom line “more 
capital” may not be the best option for enhancing productivity-based growth. The competitive 
advantages of Belarus lie in the resource-based and non-tradable sectors, while the majority of the 
manufacturing sectors are lagging behind in productivity. Belarus has symptoms of a Dutch disease 
without the trade surplus, and the devaluation of 2011 did not cure it.    
 
During 2003-2012, Belarus had an average 
growth rate of 7.1%, and during the ‘fat years’, 
i.e. 2003-2008, it was even higher – 9.5%. 
Intuitively, this prominent growth is 
questionable, as it was achieved in the context 
of dominating state ownership, centralized 
allocation of resources, government’s control 
at the factor and goods markets, as well as 
poor infrastructural reforms (for instance, 
according to the indices of the EBRD). The 
Belarusian case challenges the mainstream 
paradigm of growth in transitional countries, 
which assumes that the progress in market 
reforms is the key factor for high and 
sustainable growth. 
The simplest and most widespread explanation 
of the Belarusian phenomena is based on ‘non-
standard’ gains in productivity. This approach 
assumes that productivity is the engine of 
growth (World Bank (2012); Demidenko and 
Kuznetsov (2012)). To a large extent, these 
gains in productivity are seen as “artificial”, 
resulting from Russian injections into the 
Belarusian economy: cheap gas, specific 
schemes of oil trade, and preferences in access 
to the Russian markets (Kruk (2010)). 
However, under this approach, decomposing 
the growth in productivity by ‘natural’ and 
‘artificial’ parts is hardly possible, as the 
impact of these factors is already hidden in the 
available data. 
The IMF (2010) gave a substantially different 
explanation of Belarusian growth. They 
claimed that the average growth of 8.3% over 
the period of 2001-2008 was mainly capital-
based with a contribution of 4.8 percentage 
points, while the contribution of productivity 
growth was only 3.0 percentage points (the 
rest of growth was explained by labor and 
cyclical factors). 
The main reason behind the substantial 
difference in the explanation of growth factors 
is the statistical data on capital used during the 
growth accounting exercise. Belarusian 
official statistics reports the data on capital 
stock based on a direct survey of capital assets 
according to both gross and net (wealth) 
 
 
 
2  Forum for Research on Eastern Europe and Emerging Economies 
capital concept. However, the growth rates of 
capital are reported only for the gross stock of 
capital. These growth rates are questionable as 
they demonstrate ‘unnatural stability’ – they 
fluctuate around 2% for the last 20 years, 
despite the fact that investments during this 
period has displayed huge and volatile growth. 
Statistical offices in other CIS countries have 
reported similar dynamics of the capital stock. 
Voskoboynikov (2012), and Bessonov and 
Voskoboynikov (2008) show that this trend is 
a consequence of the statistical methodology 
used in Russia (which the Belarusian 
methodology is very similar to). In particular, 
the trend is driven by biased capital 
investments deflators (which are 
overestimated) from the periods of high 
inflation (1990-s and early 2000-s). 
If official data is used as the capital input for 
the growth accounting exercise, the 
contribution of TFP to growth will be 
overestimated. Hence, in the studies of the 
World Bank (2012) and Demidenko and 
Kuznetsov (2012), the leading role of TFP 
may be due to the use of the official data on 
the capital stock. 
Motivated by this concern, we use two 
different methods to evaluate the value of 
capital inputs (see Kruk and Bornukova (2013) 
for more details). The first alternative to using 
the data from direct capital survey is to exploit 
a perpetual inventory method (PIM): the 
historical assessment of initial capital stock is 
further adjusted by the flow of investments 
and depreciation. However, if there is a bias in 
deflators within the sample, the series will also 
be distorted. This problem may be eliminated 
if the initial stock will be selected at the 
moment when there is no bias in investment 
deflator, in the period of moderate inflation. 
We call this approach PIM-backward.  
The second approach to constructing capital 
series exploits the concept of productive 
capital and the data on the flow of capital. It 
assumes that the productive capacity of a 
capital good depends on its age. The 
productive stock of a capital good (i.e. the 
gross stock adjusted by the age-efficiency 
profile) generates a flow – capital services. 
The latter is the productive stock adjusted by 
the user cost of the individual capital good. 
For the total output of an industry (or 
economy) one should aggregate the inputs by 
different capital goods, which in contrast to the 
net (wealth) concept depends not only on the 
value of capital goods, but also on their user 
costs. This approach has solid theoretical 
foundations, which is the reason it is 
prioritized in productivity studies.  
From the view of available data in the case of 
Belarus, this approach has a number of 
powerful advantages. First, we use individual 
deflators for individual capital goods, which 
are expected to be less biased than total 
deflators for the industry. Second, we use 
heterogeneous depreciation rates for each 
capital good in each industry based on actual 
data of ‘accounting depreciation’, while we 
would have to use homogenous assumptions 
for each industry in the case of net (wealth) 
concept. Third, we can exclude residential 
housing from our measure of capital input.  
There are, however, also disadvantages. First, 
data of newly employed capital goods (in 
direct surveys of capital assets) and data on 
capital investments differ rather substantially. 
Traditionally, the data on capital investments 
is treated as more reliable, but based on the 
direct surveys of capital assets we have to use 
the series of newly employed capital goods as 
a flow variable when running PIM. Second, 
we use exogenous real interest rate for 
computing unit user costs, but the results are 
very sensitive to our assumptions on the real 
interest rates across industries. Third, the 
necessity to exclude residential housing from 
the data (because of ‘mixed historical prices’) 
may be interpreted as a loss of information. 
Given the strengths and weaknesses of the 
approach, we prioritize it on the industrial 
level, but prefer the PIM-backward approach 
for an aggregate economy analysis. 
Based on the PIM-backward measure for the 
total economy (see Figure 1), we may argue 
that the contribution of TFP to growth was 
more modest during the last decade than what 
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was reported in the majority of previous 
studies on Belarusian growth. This finding is 
of fundamental importance for the growth 
agenda: only productivity-based growth may 
be treated as sustainable, since capital growth 
will slow down as the capital approaches its 
stationary value. We argue that only the policy 
directed to promotion of productivity is vital 
for growth prospects. 
Figure 1. Contribution of Production Factors 
and TFP to the Growth of Gross Value Added 
(PIM-Backward Approach) 
 
The dynamics of productivity divided 
according to industries (see Table 1) display 
that the leaders in productivity growth are 
either industries that produce non-tradable 
goods (communications, finance, construction) 
or those that have a chance of ‘artificial 
productivity gains’ (chemical and 
petrochemical manufacturing, and fuel).  
Table 1. Initial Level and Growth Rates of 
Productivity in Major Industries 
 
 
However, the theory suggests that the leaders 
in productivity growth should be the industries 
producing tradable goods. . This contradiction 
may be interpreted in two ways. First, one may 
argue that a more competitive environment 
and larger share of private ownership (which 
are seen in the financial industry, trade and 
catering) are the core reasons for high 
productivity level and growth rates in 
‘domestic industries’. Second, an attractive 
position of ‘domestic industries’ may reflect a 
high level of domestic prices rather than 
‘natural’ productivity. The base year for our 
computations is 2009, in which both the real 
effective exchange rate of the national 
currency and income were relatively high. The 
devaluation of 2011 fixed the problem only 
temporarily, since the inflation in 2011-2013 
quickly eroded the benefits of the devaluation. 
Therefore, the indicators, in terms of 2009 
prices, may capture the changes in nominal 
values as the main component of the 
productivity gains, while from a longer-term 
perspective it would be seen as mainly price 
movements without substantial progress in 
productivity. In our view, the second 
explanation is the main reason for the non-
standard disposition of productivity levels and 
growth rates among industries.  
 
If that is the case, the bigger picture looks as 
follows. Industries producing tradable goods 
suffer from the lack of progress in 
productivity, i.e. lose their competitive 
advantage; enhancements in total productivity 
are mainly due to industries with ‘artificial 
productivity gains’. The latter allows domestic 
prices to grow, making a productivity illusion 
of domestic industries. All together these 
symptoms are quite similar to the Dutch 
disease. 
 
One more finding from the productivity 
analysis at the national level is the lack of 
productivity gains from reallocation of 
resources from less productive industries to 
more productive ones. A scatter-plot between 
capital accumulation growth rates and TFP 
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growth rates (see Figure 2) demonstrates no 
clear relationship between them.  
 
Figure 2. Growth Rates of Capital Input vs. 
TFP Growth Rates in Manufacturing 
Branches, 2006-2010.  
 
Notes: The sizes of the circles correspond to industry 
shares in value added.  
 
However, if there was a free allocation of 
resources, more productive industries would 
accumulate more capital. Moreover, the same 
indicators under the PIM-backward approach 
demonstrate clear negative relationship. A 
‘soft’ interpretation of this phenomenon 
assumes that the lack of reallocation of capital 
restrains the development of total productivity. 
A ‘tighter’ interpretation assumes that at least 
in some industries there is a trade-off between 
capital accumulation and productivity gains. 
For instance, in Kruk and Haiduk (2013) it is 
shown that spurring capital accumulation 
through the practice of directed lending leads 
to losses in efficiency through a number of 
channels. Hence, the simplest way to increase 
aggregate productivity is to depart from the 
centralized allocation of capital and unblock 
capital inflows to more productive industries 
and vice versa. 
 
Figure 3 documents the mobility of labor 
markets across the manufacturing industries in 
Belarus. While one can expect that labor flow 
into more productive industries, it is not 
completely true for the Belarusian 
manufacturing sector. 
  
Figure 3: Labor growth and TFP growth in 
industries of Belarusian manufacturing, 
(capital services approach).  
 
Notes: The sizes of the circles correspond to industry 
shares in value added.  
 
Two distinct trends emerge in the labor 
market. On the one hand, some industries 
exhibit textbook behavior: increases in TFP 
are associated with increases in the number of 
people employed. The best example here is the 
fuel industry, which experiences TFP increases 
due to preferential oil prices. However, there 
are industries that gain TFP and lose labor at 
the same time. The chemical industry, 
machinery manufacturing and woodworking 
are examples of this pattern. These industries 
have experienced rapid capital accumulation, 
which, coupled with high gains in TFP, should 
have contributed to the increases in labor 
productivity. Surprisingly, though, these 
industries did not attract more labor. A 
possible explanation for this counterintuitive 
pattern is the excessive employment at the 
beginning of the period in question. In this 
case, a decrease in the number of people 
employed may have contributed to the 
increases of TFP.  
Indeed, Figure 4 confirms our hypothesis: 
labor was flowing from the industries with 
lower labor productivity to the industries with 
higher labor productivity in general. Industries 
in which TFP increased and which were 
accompanied by a labor decrease, featured low 
labor productivity in the beginning of the 
period in consideration, more precisely in 
2005. Only the chemical industry exhibited the 
unexpected behavior: it lost labor despite high 
initial productivity. By getting rid of excessive 
employment they were contributing to an 
increase in TFP.  
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Figure 4: Labor shifts into the sectors with 
higher labor productivity.  
 
Notes: The sizes of the circles correspond to industry 
shares in value added.  
 
How is Belarus doing relative to other 
countries? We have compared Belarusian TFP 
to the TFP of the leader of transition, the 
Czech Republic, and to the regional leader, 
Sweden. The Czech Republic is more 
developed than Belarus (in 2010 Czech GDP 
per capita (PPP-corrected) was 1.73 times 
higher than in Belarus), and, theoretically, it 
should be much more difficult and costly for it 
to continue approaching the technological 
frontier. However, our findings suggest that 
the Czech Republic is catching up with 
Sweden in terms of TFP, and doing it faster 
than Belarus (see Figure 5).  
Figure 5: TFP of Belarus and the Czech 
Republic relative to TFP of Sweden, (PIM-
backward approach). 
  
Over the last 10 years, Belarus has closed only 
5 percentage points of the gap with Sweden. 
The Czech Republic, where the contribution of 
TFP to growth was more substantial, has 
managed to close 8 percentage points of the 
gap.  
In absolute numbers (in ‘international’ dollars 
of 2010), aggregate TFP in Belarus in 2010 
was 2.92 versus 4.66 in the Czech Republic 
and 9.38 in Sweden (according to the PIM-
backwards method). However, the aggregate 
picture does not reflect the situation in the 
sectors of the economy and industries of 
manufacturing.  
 
Table 2:  Comparative advantage of 
Belarusian industries: winners and losers 
(capital services approach) 
 
 
Table 2 documents the comparative 
advantages and disadvantages of the 
Belarusian economy in 2010 according to the 
capital services approach. Both the capital 
services approach and the PIM-backwards 
approach produce the same winners and losers 
list with the only difference being that the 
PIM-backwards method has the construction 
sector among winners. It is not surprising to 
see resource-based industries among the 
winners (mining and quarrying mainly reflects 
the extraction of potash, while the chemical 
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industry benefits both from potash and from 
preferential process for Russian oil). Food 
manufacturing is among the winners mostly 
due to the price scissors in agriculture: food 
producers buy their inputs at very low prices.  
The non-tradable sectors are among winners, 
and the majority of the manufacturing sectors 
are among the losers. Again, this is similar to 
the symptoms of the Dutch disease. It is ironic 
that Belarus has symptoms of a Dutch disease 
without the trade surplus. Instead, the desire of 
the government to inflate wages combined 
with the preferences for Russia led to the 
development of the same diagnosis.  
Belarusian economic growth is less TFP-led 
than is commonly believed. While the labor 
market proves to be relatively successful in its 
reallocation of employees and its contribution 
to aggregate increases in efficiency, the capital 
market is distorted by government 
interventions. Capital accumulation does not 
necessarily lead to increases in TFP, and the 
new modernization policy with the bottom line 
of “more capital” may not be the best option 
for enhancing growth. Our conclusion is that 
Belarus should find new sources for TFP-led 
growth.   
▪ 
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